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Immigrants and Welfare Receipt in Ireland
* 
 
Since 2004, Ireland has included in its system of social welfare payments criteria for receipt 
which limit the extent to which immigrants can receive welfare payments. In this paper, we 
compare the rates of receipt of welfare for immigrants and natives to see if the outcome is 
consistent with the operation of this policy. Using data from 2008, we generally find lower 
rates of welfare receipt among immigrants. While the numbers of immigrants claiming 
unemployment-related payments surged at the outset of the recession, there appears to have 
been a quicker stabilisation in the number of immigrants claiming such benefits relative to 
natives, based on official data from 2007 to 2010. This would be consistent with the on-going 
implementation of the type of criteria introduced in 2004. 
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Section 1: Introduction 
 
In many countries, the interaction between immigration policies and welfare policies 
are controversial. As discussed in Barrett and McCarthy (2008), one element of the 
debate is the extent to which immigrants make demands on welfare systems (Riphahn, 
2004; Hansen and Lofstrom, 2009) and the consequences for the public finances in 
host countries (Dustmann et al, 2010). A second element in the debate focuses on the 
extent to which generous welfare regimes attract immigrants with a propensity to 
draw on the services of the welfare state (Borjas, 1999). 
 
Our objective in this paper is to examine the issue of welfare use by immigrants in 
Ireland, focussing on whether immigrants are more or less likely to receive payments 
relative to natives. Ireland is a particularly interesting case study for this question. 
Since mid-2004, when immigration into Ireland accelerated on account of the 
expansion of the EU, Ireland has sought to limit the possibility for immigrants to 
access welfare by imposing conditions for receipt. As discussed below, initially the 
condition was based on residency, with two years of continuous residency being 
required before welfare could be accessed. Over time, this condition has evolved into 
a set of five criteria, one of which is a “centre of interest” test.  
 
We look at the question of immigrant welfare receipt relative to natives by comparing 
the proportions of immigrants and natives in receipt of various payments, initially 
without adjusting for socio-economic characteristics. We then go on to use regression 
analysis to explore whether there is an independent effect of immigrant status on the 
likelihood of receiving welfare, controlling for factors such as education and gender. 
As shown in earlier research on immigrants in Ireland, the experiences of immigrants 
tend to differ across national groups so we explore the issues in question by looking at 
broad national groups separately. We use data from the Irish component of the EU 
Survey on Income and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) for 2008. 
 
The question of immigrant welfare use in Ireland has been examined previously by 
Barrett and McCarthy (2007 and 2008). However, in those papers data from 2004 and 
2005 were used and this represented a major limitation. As immigration into Ireland 
accelerated dramatically after the accession into the EU of ten new members in May 
2004, data from 2004 and 2005 could not capture satisfactorily the experience of the 
new wave of immigrants. As a result, the analysis in this paper is the first to capture 
the post-2004 situation as data from 2008 is used. Also in this paper, we base some of 
the analysis on a merging of three waves of the EU-SILC (2006 to 2008). As a final 
element in this paper, we look at how the receipt of unemployment-related payments 
has evolved over the recession in Ireland for immigrants and natives. Given that 
Ireland has recently experienced one of the deepest recessions in the developed world 
since the 1930s, it is important to look at the recent experience. 
 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, by way of providing 
context, we look at previous work within the economics literature on immigrants and 
welfare in Ireland. We also look at the most important legislative issue of relevance, 
namely,  the habitual residence condition for receipt of welfare by  immigrants. In 
Section 3, we describe the data on which the analysis is based. We then go on to   3 
present the results of the analysis. In Section 4, we look at the trend in receipt of 
unemployment payments by natives and non-natives over the course of the recession. 
In Section 5, we offer some conclusions. 
 
Section 2: Context – literature and legislation 
 
Literature 
Barrett and McCarthy (2007) used data from EU-SILC 2004 to look at this question 
of the relative rates of receipt of welfare across immigrants and natives. As a first 
step, they report the proportions of immigrants and natives who report having 
received a payment under at least one of four payment-categories in the previous 
twelve months. The four categories are unemployment benefits and assistance, and 
disability payments and assistance. The sample is restricted to people of working age 
only and so the issue of old age pensions does not arise. This simple piece of analysis 
reveals that 15 percent of natives received some form of payment compared to only 7 
percent of immigrants.  
 
As immigrants in Ireland have been shown consistently  to have higher rates of 
education relative to natives (Barrett, Bergin and Duffy, 2006), it could have been the 
case that the lower rates of welfare receipt by immigrants was the result of different 
educational attainment as opposed to immigrants status per se. For this reason, it was 
necessary to use regression analysis to see if an “immigrant effect” still existed once 
the analysis included controls for relevant socio-economic characteristics. By running 
probit models, Barrett and McCarthy showed that immigrants were still less likely to 
have received payments,  even when controlling for factors such as educational 
attainment, with the marginal effect estimated at 5 percent. 
 
Barrett and McCarthy developed this analysis along three lines. First, they broke the 
single immigrant group into two sub-groups – those from English-speaking and non-
English-speaking countries. However, no statistically significant difference was found 
between these sub-groups. Second, instead of looking at all people of working age, 
they restricted their sample to people who were unemployed. When they did this, they 
found that immigrants were 25 percent less likely to have received payments. As there 
was no statistically significant difference between immigrants and natives in their 
likelihood of being unemployed, Barrett and McCarthy took this estimate of 25 
percent as indicating differences in eligibility or differences in willingness to apply. 
 
The third and final extension by Barrett and McCarthy was to consider the amount 
received as opposed to the more limited question of whether any payment was 
received. The results suggested lower payments for immigrants relative to natives. 
 
The same two authors returned to this issue in their later paper, Barrett and McCarthy 
(2008). This time data from EU-SILC 2005  was used. Although only a year had 
elapsed between the collection of this and the earlier data, some interesting 
differences emerged in the results. In particular, the 2005 data showed stronger 
differences between immigrants from English-speaking and non-English-speaking 
countries.  When a probit regression was run for the whole sample, there was no 
difference between the likelihood of receipt of welfare for natives and immigrants 
from English-speaking countries. However, for immigrants from non-English-
speaking countries the estimated marginal effect was -8 percent (t-statistic is 2.6).   4 
This difference between the two immigrants groups became larger when the analysis 
is restricted to the unemployed only. There was still no statistically significant 
difference between natives and immigrants from English-speaking countries in terms 
of likelihood of receiving payments. However, unemployed immigrants from non-
English-speaking countries were estimated as being 62 percent less likely to receive 
payments relative to unemployed natives. 
 
This last finding again pointed to a possibility that immigrants from non-English-
speaking countries had lower rates of eligibility relative to natives. One obvious factor 
that could explain this was the presence in Irish legislation of a “habitual residency 
condition”. Given the potential importance of this when interpreting the results in the 
two Barrett and McCarthy papers and the results below, it is useful to set out the 
details of this condition for welfare receipt. 
 
Legislation 
Social welfare payments in Ireland are made through contributory or insurance-based 
payments (without a means test) and through non-contributory payments (which are 
dependent upon a means test).  Basic social insurance payments are paid to those who 
have successfully made the required number of insurance contributions (known in 
Ireland as Pay-Related Social Insurance or PRSI). Examples of payments include 
Jobseeker Benefit, Maternity Benefit, Carer’s Benefit, Disability Benefit and 
Contributory Old-Age Pension.  
 
Social assistance payments, known as non-contributory payments, are means-tested 
with individuals required to prove their inability to support themselves through: any 
income belonging to them, a spouse or partner; any property in excess of their 
primary residence; and assets which could theoretically provide an income. Non-
contributory payments include Jobseeker’s Allowance, One-Parent Family Payment, 
Pre-Retirement Allowance, Non-Contributory Old Age Pension and Carer’s 
Allowance Supplementary Welfare Allowance. 
 
In the run up to the accession of ten new members of the EU in May 2004, concerns 
were expressed about the potential for the social welfare system to be put under 
pressure if there was a large inflow of welfare-prone immigrants from the new 
member states. In order to guard against this possibility, the government introduced a 
habitual residence condition for the receipt of social payments. The introduction of a 
HRC from 1 May 2004 saw a marked change regarding eligibility for many welfare 
payments for all nationalities (including Irish nationals) whereby access was 
conditional on a period of residence within Ireland or the UK. Initially, the Social 
Welfare (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act, 2004 (Section 17) (Commencement) Order, 
2004 outlined a basic requirement for a person to be deemed ‘habitually resident’ 
from residence in Ireland or the UK for a continuous period of two years before 
making an application for certain social welfare payments.  
 
Certain amendments to the  habitual residence condition  were introduced in 
subsequent years  but the essential feature of Irish policy remained, namely, the 
existence of conditions which provided for the possibility of denying welfare 
payments to immigrants whose  current and future attachment to Ireland could be 
shown to be weak. As of now, decisions on payments to immigrants are based on the 
following five criteria:    5 
 
  Length and continuity of residence in Ireland or in any other particular 
country; 
  Length and purpose of any absence from Ireland; 
  Nature and pattern of employment; 
  Person’s main centre of interest; 
  Future intentions of the person as they appear from all the circumstances. 
 
Should an immigrant fail to satisfy these criteria, based on an assessment by an 
official from the Department of Social Protection, they can be refused payments. In 
this way there is a degree of discretion built into the system of determination of 
habitual residence which provides scope for differential treatment of immigrants and 
natives. It is the existence of this mechanism which must be kept in mind as we look 
at the relative rates of receipt of payments across immigrants and natives in the 
sections below. 
 
Section 3: Data and Results 
 
The data on which the analysis below is based come from the EU Survey on Income 
and Living Conditions (EU-SILC) for 2008.  A full description of the sampling 
methodology can be found in Central Statistics Office (2009) but here we will set out 
the broad features of the survey. The EU-SILC is a voluntary survey of private 
households and is carried out under EU legislation. To date, it has been used mainly 
to provide information on the rates of poverty and deprivation in Ireland (CSO, 2009). 
The survey seeks to provide a nationally representative sample of households. It does 
so by first creating a sample of 2600 small areas and then selecting a random sample 
of households within each block. About 130 households were surveyed each week 
during the twelve months of 2008, resulting in a sample of 5,247 households and 
12,551 individuals. 
 
For each individual, the survey contains information on variables such as age, 
education, labour force status and earnings. It also contains information on whether or 
not each individual was in receipt of a wide range of social welfare payments in 2007, 
the year preceding the survey. Crucially for our  purposes, the place of birth and 
citizenship of each respondent is provided and we use these to identify the immigrants 
in the sample. If an individual reports themselves as having been born in Ireland and 
as being an Irish citizen, we code them as being a native. If an individual reports that 
they were born outside of Ireland and that they are not Irish citizens, we code them as 
being immigrants. 
 
Our focus is on people of working age so we exclude people under the age of 18 and 
over the age of 65. When individuals with missing values on any of the variables of 
interest are excluded, our final sample amounts to 6,441 individuals. Of these, 264 are 
immigrants which is 4.3 percent of the sample. We know from Census 2006 that over 
10 percent of the population then was made up of non-nationals so there is a clear 
under-representation of immigrants in our sample. Barrett and McCarthy (2007) 
found a similar under-representation but argued that the characteristics of the 
immigrants in the EU-SILC sample mirrored the characteristics of immigrants in the, 
much larger, Quarterly National Household Survey (QNHS).  
   6 
In Table 1, we show the proportions of immigrants and natives who received various 
types of payments in 2007 (it should be remembered that although we are using data 
which was collected in 2008, the information of payments received refers to 2007). 
The first panel of the table looks at the following payments combined: unemployment 
benefits and assistance, disability benefits and assistance, and family benefits. Our 
data show that 66.1 percent of natives received a payment under at least one of these 
headings in 2007. For immigrants, the corresponding figure was 63.3 percent. 
Although the proportion for immigrants is lower, the chi-square test for the statistical 
significance of the different indicates that there is no statistical difference.  
 
Following Barrett and McCarthy (2007 and 2008), we go on to break up the 
immigrant group into two sub-groups, those from English-speaking countries (of 
whom there are 82) and from non-English speaking countries (of whom there are 
182). The proportion of immigrants from English-speaking countries who received a 
welfare payment in 2007 was 69.5 percent; the corresponding figure for immigrants 
from non-English-speaking countries was 60.4 percent. Neither of these proportions is 
statistically different from the native proportion. We add another perspective by 
considering as sub-groups immigrants from the pre-2004 EU (numbering 116 in the 
sample) and those from the post-accession New Member States (numbering 84). 
Although the New Member State (NMS) sub-group show the lowest proportion in 
receipt of any payment in 2007, there is again no statistical difference between this 
group and the native population. 
 
In the second panel of Table 1, we look at unemployment and disability payments 
combined and at this point statistically significant differences begin to emerge 
between some immigrant groups and the native population. For all immigrants, 
combined, we see that 16.7 percent received some form of payment in 2007 – the 
corresponding figure for natives was higher, and statistically so, at 27.5 percent. There 
is no statistically significant difference between natives and immigrants from either 
English-speaking countries or the pre-accession EU. However, immigrants from non-
English speaking countries and from the NMS are less likely to have received 
payments and the difference is statistically significant. In the third panel of Table 1 
we look at the receipt of family-related benefits but  there are no statistically 
significant differences across the groups. 
 
The overall picture that emerges from Table 1 is that where statistically significant 
differences exist between immigrants and natives in terms of their likelihoods of 
having received welfare payments, immigrants are less likely to have received 
payments. Although this observation is interesting in itself, it gives rise to the usual 
question of whether this is related to the characteristics of immigrants that may be 
associated with patterns of welfare receipt or whether there is an independent 
immigrant effect. For example, more highly educated people are less likely to receive 
social welfare payments. For this reason, if immigrants are more highly educated 
relative to natives this could explain their lower rate of welfare receipt. We need to 
control for relevant socio-economic characteristics in assessing the relative 
likelihoods for immigrants and natives of receiving welfare payments. We do this 
through regression analysis. 
 
Before looking at the regression results, it is useful to look at the characteristics of the 
immigrant and natives, and within the immigrant sub-groups. Table 2 provides   7 
information on average ages, average numbers of years worked and average number 
of children. Table 3 shows relative levels of educational attainment. It is clear from 
Table 2 that the immigrants from the non-English speaking countries are younger than 
the natives and have fewer years of work experience. They also have fewer children. 
In terms of educational attainment, we see that immigrants are relative highly 
educated when compared to natives, a finding that has emerged in papers such as 
Barrett et al (2006) when using the Quarterly National Household Survey (QNHS). 
We also see that among the immigrant sub-groups, educational attainment is lowest 
among immigrants from the NMS. This was previously seen in Barrett and Duffy 
(2008) who also used the QNHS.  
 
In order to see how these characteristics might combine to alter the picture given 
above of the relative likelihoods of welfare receipt by immigrants and natives, we 
present the results from the first of our regressions in Table 4. We should point out the 
regressions are probit regressions, due to the binary nature of the dependent variable. 
We present the marginal effects in the tables as opposed to coefficients because the 
non-linear nature of the estimates makes the interpretation of the coefficients difficult. 
 
In Table 4, the dependent variable is whether any of the following payments were 
received in 2007: unemployment benefits and assistance, disability benefits and 
assistance and family benefits. As such, Table 4 is the multivariate equivalent of the 
first panel in Table 1. The first column of marginal effects shows that there is no 
statistically significant difference between natives and all immigrants combined. This 
was also the case in the raw data and so controlling for factors such as education and 
work experience is not altering the basic picture. There are no statistically significant 
differences between immigrants and natives when we break the immigrants into the 
sub-groups based on whether they come from countries that speak English. However, 
we do find a statistically significant result when we look at the immigrants from the 
NMS – they are almost 19 percent less likely to receive benefits relative to natives.  
 
In Table 5, the dependent variable is limited to the receipt of unemployment and 
disability payments only, mirroring the second panel of Table 1. As was the case 
when comparing the first panel in Table 1 and Table 4, the results are similar. The 
probit regression shows that immigrants are 7 percentage points less likely to have 
received an unemployment or disability payment in 2007. However, for immigrants 
from English speaking countries and from the pre-accession EU, the difference is not 
significant. For immigrants from non-English speaking countries and from the NMS, 
they are less likely to have received such payments relative to natives and the 
differences are statistically significant. 
 
In Table 6, we show the regression results in respect of family benefits. As might 
have been expected based on the third panel of Table 1, no statistically significant 
marginal effects show up across any of the immigrant groups. 
 
A finding that has emerged in the international literature in this area is that refugees 
often experience higher rates of welfare receipt relative to both natives and other 
immigrants.  One such example is Hansen and Lofstrom (2009) who consider the 
Swedish situation. In our data it is not possible to identify refugees as such. However, 
we thought it was important to try to get some sense of this issue for Ireland. One   8 
route which we explored was to look at the countries from which persons with refugee 
status  were likely to come and to use this as a proxy of such a status.  
 
When we tried to put this approach into operation, we found that we had only 22 
individuals in the 2008 sample who were from countries that showed up as being 
among the ten largest sources of applicants for asylum. For this reason we tried to 
pool data from three waves of the EU-SILC, 2006 through 2008. Unfortunately, the 
coding of countries changed across the waves and so our original strategy could not 
be implemented.  
 
As an alternative approach to getting some insight into the rate of welfare use by 
refugees, we decided to look at immigrants from North and West Africa as a group. 
We should stress that this is a very imprecise approach to this issue as many refugees 
come from elsewhere in Africa and from elsewhere in the world. In Table 7, we show 
the results from probit regressions where the dependent variables are: all benefits 
(column 1), unemployment and disability only (column 2) and family related benefits 
(column 3). The controls are the same as those used in the earlier probits and so the 
results are comparable with the earlier tables. 
 
As can be seen in Table 7, immigrants from Africa (North and West) do appear to 
have higher rates of welfare receipt relative to natives, when all benefits are 
combined. However, this observation is explained by a higher rate of receipt of family 
related benefits and not through receipt of unemployment or disability benefits.  
 
With the exception of North and West African immigrants and their relatively higher 
rates of receipt of family benefits, the only cases in which there seem to be significant 
differences between immigrants and natives is with respect to unemployment and 
disability payments. For immigrants from non-English-speaking countries and for 
immigrants  from the NMS, they are less likely to have received payments. An 
obvious question that arises is whether or not this was related to eligibility differences 
or possibly different rates of take-up across groups with similar eligibility.  
 
This is a difficult  question to address with the data available to us but we have 
attempted to provide some insight in the following way. We have once again run 
probit regressions but this time we have restricted the sample to immigrants and 
natives who are unemployed and we  only consider unemployment and disability 
payments as the dependent variables. The results are shown in Table 8.  
 
A number of important results emerge. For unemployed immigrants as a group, they 
are less likely to receive benefits relative to unemployed natives. However, the 
differences are not significant when we look at the sub-groups English-speaking and 
non-English speaking and EU15 and NMS, both for the 2008 sample only. However, 
when we look at the combined samples from 2006 and 2008, we see much stronger 
evidence of lower rates of receipt among immigrants.  
 
As a final element in our analysis of the EU-SILC data, we address the question of 
whether or not any of the immigrant groups are at a greater risk of poverty relative to 
comparable Irish people. The results so far would suggest that the only group around 
whom we might have concerns is immigrants from the NMS as these are the only 
group who appear to be experiencing lower rates of welfare receipt across the broad   9 
range of benefits. To the extent that welfare fulfils its role of keeping people out of 
poverty, we would be less concerned about other groups based on the results so far. 
 
In Table 9, we present the result from a regression in which the dependent variable is 
equal to one if the individual lives in a household where equivalised income is less 
than 60 percent of the median income. The sample is based on the pooling of the 
years 2006 to 2008. As can be seen, a surprising result to emerge is that immigrants 
from the pre-accession EU are more likely to be at risk of poverty relative to natives. 
Neither NMS nor North and West  African immigrants are at greater risk but 
immigrants from “other countries” are. As the “other” group is quite diverse and 
covers countries such as China, India and Brazil it is difficult to provide a theory as to 
why this result has emerged. However, it will certainly be important to explore this 
more fully. 
 
Section 4: The recession and trends in welfare receipt 
 
Between 2008 and 2010, Ireland has experienced a deep recession. Real gross 
domestic product fell by a cumulative 11 percent between 2008 and 2009; the rate of 
unemployment increased from 4.9 percent at the beginning of 2008 to 13.6 percent in 
mid-2010. According to Barrett and Kelly (2010), the impact of the downturn has 
been particularly severe for immigrants, with annual employment losses being as high 
as 20 percent in mid 2009 as compared to 7 percent for natives. 
 
In the analysis above, we generally found lower rates of welfare receipt among 
immigrants relative to natives and this was consistent with the operation of the 
habitual residency condition. Given the dramatic turnaround in the economy and its 
impact on non-natives, it is interesting to see if the operation of the habitual residence 
condition  can be seen in official data on the numbers receiving unemployment 
benefits and payments. 
 
In Figure 1, we plot the annual change in the numbers of national and non-nationals 
on the Live Register (i.e. “signing on” for unemployment benefits and assistance) for 
each month from June 2007 and October 2010. For each month, we have calculated 
the change on the same month of the previous year. It should be noted that we are 
observing changes in the stocks of national and non-nationals and that these stocks are 
made up of inflows and outflows. As can be seen, the rate of increase in the numbers 
of non-nationals on the Live Register exceeded that of nationals up to early 2009 and 
was also rising at a faster pace. This is consistent with the picture presented in Barrett 
and Kelly (2010) of significantly larger job losses among immigrants relative to 
natives in this period. The rate of increase in the numbers on the Live Register started 
to fall around April/May for both groups but the pace of the fall was steeper for non-
nationals. By late 2009, the rate of increase for nationals  exceeded that on non-
national and from mid-2010, the number of non-nationals was actually declining, in 
spite of continued increases for the nationals. 
 
The trend depicted in Figure 1 could be consistent with a slower pace of job losses 
among non-nationals from mid-2010 onwards, relative to natives. However, the trend 
in the picture is also consistent with the following process. Immigrants who entered 
the Live Register may initially have been in receipt of unemployment benefits, having 
made the required number of social insurance contributions. However, when these   10 
benefits were exhausted after one year, they would have had to apply for the means-
tested unemployment assistance payment. Their application would have been assessed 
and subjected to the five criteria mentioned above. A strict application of the criteria 
may have led to exits from the Live Register based on refused applications as opposed 
to more favourable labour market outcomes. We cannot test  for this but merely 
outline it here as a possible explanation of what we observe in Figure 1. 
 
Section 5: Conclusion 
 
In the Introduction, we noted that Ireland had incorporated into its system of social 
welfare payments an explicit condition which was aimed at limiting the exposure of 
the welfare system to large-scale immigration. By initially  imposing the habitual 
residency condition in 2004 and then replacing it with the five criteria listed in 
Section 2, the state was aiming to ensure that it could contain possible demands on the 
welfare system. 
 
The results of our analysis would suggest that Ireland’s approach to this issue has 
been successful. The analysis generally shows that in the years preceding the 
recession, immigrants were less likely to be in receipt of welfare payments, whether 
we look at adjusted or unadjusted data. The recession, and the consequent job losses 
among immigrants, gave rise to a possible surge in the numbers of immigrants 
receiving welfare benefits. While this seemed to happen at the outset of the recession, 
the more recent trends in the numbers on the Live Register would suggest that the 
numbers of non-nationals stabilised, even as the number of nationals on the Live 
Register continued to rise.  
 
While the approach can be deemed as “successful” in terms of limiting the number of 
immigrants drawing benefits, there remains a question mark over the impact of the 
policy on poverty levels among immigrants. Our analysis of relative rates of poverty 
between immigrants and natives was based on data from 2008 and so we were not 
able to establish the impact of the recession. Given the evidence in Barrett and Kelly 
(2010) on the severity of the recession on immigrant employment, it is possible that 
the approach to immigrants in the welfare system is resulting in hardship and so a 
note of caution is needed.   11 
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Table 1: Proportions of Natives and Immigrants in Receipt of Social Welfare 
Payments, EU-SILC 2008 
   Social transfers*   vs Natives  
Pearson Chi-
Square Sig 
Native  66.1   
Immigrant  63.3  .331 
     
Immigrant (English 
speaking) 
69.5  .522 
Immigrant (non English 
speaking) 
60.4  .109 
     
EU 15  62.1  .363 
EU12  53.6  .358 
*Social transfers include UB & DISAB, Family benefits   
     
     
   Unemployment benefits(incl 
disab) 
 vs Natives  
Pearson Chi-
Square Sig 
Native  27.5   
Immigrant  16.7  .000 
     
Immigrant (English 
speaking) 
29.3  .725 
Immigrant (non English 
speaking) 
11.0  .000 
     
EU 15  20.7  .102 
EU12  13.1  .003 
     
     
   Family/children benefits   vs Natives  
Pearson Chi-
Square Sig 
Native  50.1   
Immigrant  54.5  .161 
     
Immigrant (English 
speaking) 
52.4  .679 
Immigrant (non English 
speaking) 
55.5  .154 
     
EU 15  49.1  .831 
EU12  48.8  .809 
   13 
Table 2: Average ages, years worked and number of children, immigrant and natives, 
EU-SILC 2008 




Native  43.6  21.5  2.0 
Immigrant  37.4  15.8  1.8 
       
Immigrant (English 
speaking) 
46.5  23.6  1.9 
Immigrant (non English 
speaking) 
33.3  12.0  1.7 
       
EU 15  43.8  22.2  1.7 
EU12  29.8  9.3  1.6 
 
 
Table 3: Educational attainment, immigrants and natives, EU-SILC 2008 
   Native  Immigran
t 




















33.8  28.0    17.1  33.0    20.7  46.4 
Low Tertiary 
 




7.1  11.4    7.3  13.2    13.8  6.0 
Total  100.0  100.0     100.0  100.0     100  100 
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Table 4: Probit regressions, marginal effects, dependent variable: receipt of any 
benefit, EU-SILC 2008 
VARIABLES  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
       
immigrant  -0.0374     
  (0.0333)     
immig_eng    0.00124   
    (0.0557)   
immig_non_eng    -0.0571   
    (0.0409)   
eu15      -0.0231 
      (0.048) 
eu12      -0.187*** 
      (0.0586) 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Table 5: Probit regressions, marginal effects, dependent variable: receipt of 
unemployment or disability payments, EU-SILC 2008 
VARIABLES  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
       
immigrant  -0.0724***     
  (0.0268)     
immig_eng    0.0153   
    (0.0504)   
immig_non_eng    -0.122***   
    (0.0295)   
eu15      -0.0397 
      (0.0415) 
eu12      -0.115*** 
      (0.0399) 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 6: Probit regressions, marginal effects, dependent variable: receipt of family 
related benefits, EU-SILC 2008 
VARIABLES  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3 
       
immigrant  -0.00773     
  (0.0114)     
immig_eng    0.0122   
    (0.00917)   
immig_non_eng    -0.0304   
    (0.0232)   
eu15      0.00374 
      (0.0115) 
eu12      -0.0478 
      (0.0387) 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 7: Probit Results for African Immigrants, EU-SILC 2008 
Variable  UB & DISAB & 
FAMB 









Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Table 8: Probit regressions, marginal effects, dependent variable: receipt of 
unemployment or disability payments – unemployed only, EU-SILC 2008 
VARIABLES  Model 1  Model 2  Model 3  Model 4 (pooled 
sample 2006-
2008) 
         
immigrant  -0.248*       
  (0.132)       
immig_eng    -0.329     
    (0.262)     
immig_non_eng    -0.224     
    (0.149)     
eu15      -0.341  -0.138 
      (0.215)  (0.0858) 
eu12      -0.000593  -0.323** 
      (0.188)  (0.161) 
Africa        -0.386* 
        (0.202) 
Other        -0.209* 
        (0.122) 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 9: Probit regression, marginal effects, risk of poverty, pooled sample EU-SILC 




eu15  0.0808*** 
  (0.0179) 
eu12  -0.0254 
  (0.0161) 
africa  0.051 
  (0.0569) 
other  0.0772*** 
  (0.0296) 
number of children 
aged less than 18 
0.0267*** 
(0.0019) 
   
single_female  -0.0434*** 
  (0.00591) 
married_male  -0.0667*** 
  (0.00527) 
married_female  -0.0719*** 
  (0.00481) 
Years_Work  -0.000997*** 
  (0.000371) 
Years_wrk2  3.76E-06 
  (5.23E-06) 
Secondar  -0.157*** 
  (0.00501) 
Tertiary  -0.122*** 
  (0.00291) 
   
Observations  19341 
LR chi2  1681 
Prob > chi2  0 
Pseudo R2  0.11 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Figure 1: Annual rate of increase in numbers on the Live Register, June 2007 to 
October 2010 
 
 
 